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  Abstract 
We conduct a study on 99 actively managed Norwegian mutual funds from 1996 to 2019 to 
investigate whether funds deliver returns in excess of passive benchmarks and if the funds' 
performance persists over time. We use the Fama and French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor 
models as proxies for the passive benchmarks. Additionally, we bootstrap the results using 
Fama and French methodology to differentiate skill from luck in the mutual funds' returns. We 
find no evidence of skill among managers to produce superior returns for investors. To test for 
performance persistence, we employ recursive portfolio approach, construct contingency 
tables, and obtain cross-product ratios with corresponding Z and Chi-Squared statistics.  The 
results of persistence tests suggest that only past losers remain losers in the subsequent period, 
while past winners are more likely to switch from outperforming to underperforming in the 
following period. Our study is the most comprehensive and up to date analysis of actively 
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We examine the performance and performance persistence of the survivorship bias-free 
sample of 99 actively managed Norwegian equity mutual funds from 1996 to 2019. We 
address two main questions: i) Do actively managed Norwegian mutual funds outperform the 
passive benchmark net of fees? ii) Can the actively managed funds perform persistently?  
Our focus is on actively managed funds since these funds claim to persistently generate an 
excess return above the passive benchmark through superior stock selection or market timing 
skills. Seeing the substantial growth in assets under management of mutual funds in Norway, 
we find the study on actively managed mutual funds is valuable due to its implications for 
investors and their choice of investment. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to provide insight into whether actively managed 
mutual funds gain abnormal returns. Most of the researchers like Jensen (1968), Elton (1993), 
Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2010) discovered that mutual fund managers not only 
fail to beat the market but also underperform the passive benchmark on net returns. The 
researchers found that only a handful of mutual funds can outperform the passive benchmark 
on net returns through the manager's stock-picking ability. In the study that was carried out on 
the Norwegian mutual funds market, Sørensen (2010) concluded that there is no evidence of 
outperformance for the actively managed funds.  
Considering the primary methodologies used in the literature, we employ the most efficient 
methods to investigate Norwegian mutual funds' performance. We employ the Fama and 
French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models as the benchmarks assuming that an alpha 
estimation obtained above the benchmark models is the excess return gained by managers’ 
skills. However, due to non-normality in the distribution of mutual funds returns, it is 
challenging to distinguish whether excess returns originate from managerial ability or luck. 
To differentiate between luck and stock-picking ability, we bootstrap alphas by employing 
Fama and French bootstrap method (2010). The findings indicate that the best-performing 
funds fail to beat the market, while the worst-performing funds generate significantly negative 
alphas when funds are ranked by their alphas. When funds are ranked by t-statistics of alphas, 
the bootstrapped results imply no abnormal performance among Norwegian mutual funds. 
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Since some studies found evidence for positive and negative abnormal performance, the topic 
of how long that performance persists became a subject of interest for both investors and 
academic researchers. By analyzing performance persistence, it is easier to differentiate skill 
from luck since the longer the performance lasts, the higher the chances that performance is 
not a noisy measurement but an indication of superior or inferior managerial performance. If 
mutual funds outperform the market consistently, we can conclude that managerial skill, not 
luck, creates excess return. On the contrary, if mutual funds underperform the market 
continuously, it cannot be only due to bad luck, and it is an indication of weak managerial 
performance. 
Similar to the performance research, the main studies on performance persistence have been 
conducted on the US market data. The findings in the studies indicate different degrees of 
performance persistence for various time horizons. While Malkeil (1995) found no evidence 
that mutual funds repeat their performance over time, Hendricks, Petal, and Zechhauser (1993) 
and Carhart (1997) argued that there is persistence among the worst-performing mutual funds.  
We also investigate whether Norwegian actively managed mutual funds persistently produce 
an abnormal return against the passive indices. We conduct the highly relevant and valid 
persistence tests found in the literature: recursive portfolio test, contingency table, and cross-
product ratio. The tests are conducted using both net raw returns and risk-adjusted returns to 
get a more comprehensive insight into the persistence level in inferior and superior funds' 
returns. We analyze performance persistence from a short to a long-time window to see if 
persistence varies with time horizon. The results of recursive portfolio tests are bootstrapped 
to identify if winners remain winners by luck or due to managerial skill. The bootstrapping 
technique also aims to detect if losers continue the lousy performance due to bad luck or the 
manager's lack of skill. This analysis reveals that past-losers in the lowest-ranked quantiles 
continue producing negative risk-adjusted returns both in the short and long term. In 
comparison, past winners show either zero alpha or underperform in the following period. The 
results of the bootstrap test indicate inferior managerial skills rather than bad luck. The 
evidence of contingency tables and cross-product ratio using raw and risk-adjusted returns 
shows that the results are consistent with the previous ones in which losers persist in being 
losers in the following periods. At the same time, winners do not experience persistent positive 
performance over time. Besides, the worst-performing funds have the highest likelihood to 
disappear in the subsequent period.  
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The findings of our study contribute to the literature as the most up to date analysis of actively 
managed Norwegian mutual funds, in which we employ a variety of proven techniques to 
evaluate performance and performance persistence. This research also sheds light on the 
Norwegian mutual funds' performance against passive indices, which provides useful material 
for investors in the equity markets to make a more informed investment decision. If actively 
managed funds cannot create excess returns above the passive benchmark net of fees, investors 
would be better off by following low-cost passive investment strategies. The findings are also 
significant from the economic perspective because financial intermediaries are well-rewarded 
due to their value-adding activities. If the superior performance is created by luck rather than 
managerial ability, paying the management fees and investing in mutual funds seems irrational 
and value destructive for the economy (Berk & Green, 2004). 
The study proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a literature review of the most significant 
and relevant research on the topic, section 3 describes the data set and the variables that are 
employed in the research, section 4 defines the techniques and models which are implemented 
in the study, section 5 provides the empirical results of performance measurements as well as 
the finding of the performance persistence tests and section 6 presents the conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
The ability of mutual fund managers to persistently generate returns has been a subject of 
numerous studies. The literature on the topic has been evolving over the years, and it has 
started with the question of how to measure mutual fund performance appropriately.  
Jensen (1968) used the alpha variable to evaluate the performance of 115 open-end mutual 
funds in the United States for the period 1945 to 1964. He defined alpha as a return that is 
generated in excess of the CAPM model benchmark. Statistically significant nonzero alpha 
implies managerial ability to forecast security prices. If a manager is successful in forecasting, 
the alpha is positive. The alpha is negative if a manager performs poorly in forecasting. The 
results of the study reveal that, on average, funds are not able to predict future security prices 
that outperform buy-the-market-and-hold policy even with the returns gross of management 
expenses. Jensen was one of the first researchers to conclude that the mutual funds cannot 
systematically outperform the benchmark model.   
Grinnblatt and Titman (1992) introduced a new performance benchmark constructed from 
passive portfolios to account for the biases that CAPM benchmark exhibited. For instance, 
small or income-oriented funds seem to outperform using the conventional CAPM benchmark. 
Their new benchmark had additional risk factors that controlled for the firm characteristics, 
such as size and past returns, to evaluate fund performance more accurately. Grinnblatt and 
Titman examined the performance of 279 US mutual funds from 1974 to 1984 and conducted 
a 5-year persistence test. The results indicate positive performance persistence, which cannot 
be explained by benchmark inefficiencies related to yield, CAPM beta, interest rate sensitivity, 
or skewness. The persistent performance could have been partially explained by persistent 
differences in transaction costs and fees.  
Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) also conducted a performance persistence test but on 
the shorter horizon. They used quarterly free-survivorship bias data (net of management fees) 
from 1974 to 1988, including open-end, no-load, growth-oriented equity funds. The results 
indicate that performance persistence is significant for the best and worst-performing funds up 
to four quarters. However, the outperformance of top funds is marginal in comparison to the 
market benchmarks.  
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In order to further examine persistent returns of the best and worst-performing funds, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) tested the strategy of selling losers and buying winners from 
1965 to 1989. They established that the winners' positive returns minus losers' portfolios 
continue for one year and vanishes entirely within two years after formation.  
The short-lived performance persistence detected in the studies was commonly attributed to 
the managerial ability to beat the market. Malkiel (1995) tested that claim by conducting a 
study on all the funds that have ever existed. He used annual mutual fund returns from 1971 
to 1991 and concluded that funds underperform the market not only net of management fees 
but also gross of all expenses excluding load fees. Malkiel argued that many studies tend to 
use data sets that contain only survived funds; therefore, the results incur strong survivorship 
bias, which distorts the conclusion on the performance of mutual funds. Although he 
documented performance persistence, he suggested that it can result from survivorship bias 
since he included mutual funds that existed for at least two years. Malkiel concluded that there 
is no compelling evidence for the superior managerial skill to generate strong, persistent 
excess returns. 
A similar study was done by Brown and Goetzmann in 1995. They conducted a persistence 
test on an annual basis with survivorship-bias-free data and found evidence for performance 
persistence in excess of ex-ante benchmarks. They found out that persistence varies with the 
time horizon chosen in the studies. Brown and Goetzmann also noticed irregular reversed 
patterns in the winners and losers' performance that is not captured by the risk-adjusted models 
and cannot be related to managers' strategies. Additionally, the weak-performing funds are 
more likely to disappear but not entirely; thus, the survived funds might have driven the 
performance persistence results for the worst-performing funds. 
Carhart (1997) found evidence for unexplained short-term persistence only among the worst-
performing funds. He argued that the short-term persistence found by Hendricks et al. (1993) 
is explained by the Fama and French 3-factor model, momentum factor, differences in load 
fees, expense ratios, and portfolio turnover, but not by the superior stock-picking skills of the 
managers. Carhart concluded that there is little evidence of managerial skill, which 
nevertheless disappears with higher fees for investors.  
Bollen and Busse (2004) modified the Carhart approach to test performance persistence. They 
ranked mutual funds by the risk-adjusted quarter returns over the following three-month 
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period. They found that the top decile generates a statistically significant abnormal return. The 
results they got are robust with changes in market timing, stock selection, market models, and 
with inclusion of momentum strategy. The results clash with Carhart's results, which Bollen 
and Busse attributed to their particular use of risk-adjusted returns and change in the duration 
of ranking and post-ranking periods. Despite the robust results of superior performance, Bollen 
and Busse questioned the economic significance of their findings. 
While performance persistence was evidenced in various studies, the economic significance 
of this finding became a subject of particular interest. Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and 
White (2006) investigated whether the excess returns are attributed to luck or funds' manager 
skills in selecting stocks. They used the bootstrapping technique to differentiate between luck 
and stock-picking skills. The empirical findings on the US mutual funds between 1975 and 
2002 indicate that mutual funds' performance cannot be solely explained by luck. 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) examined if the unobserved actions might have 
explained superior persistent fund performance. They included factors like timing of trades, 
related transaction costs, managers' informational advantage, trading costs, the agency 
problem, and investor externalities in their model. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng studied the 
effect of these unobserved actions by analyzing the "return gap" between the investor and the 
buy-and-hold returns. The results show that the effect of unobserved factors is persistent in 
the long run both for the bottom and the top-performing funds; however, the impact of these 
actions varies significantly across funds. They also argued that the return gap can be a 
significant "predictive power" for fund performance. 
To find whether alphas are genuine or the result of luck, Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) 
employed the False Discovery Rate (FDR) measure. By accounting for the presence of luck 
using FDR, they were able to estimate how many funds deliver zero, negative, and positive 
alphas. Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers concluded that around 76.6% of all funds have zero 
alphas, 21.3% have negative alphas, and only 2.1% have positive alphas. They also argued 
that the persistence of mutual fund performance is partially driven by persistent expense ratios.  
Fama and French (2010) investigated the luck versus managerial skill question by applying 
the bootstrapping methodology on the mutual funds in the CRSP database between 1984 and 
2006. They found that mutual funds underperform the CAPM, 3-factor, and 4-factor models 
by approximately the expense costs. The funds with weak stock-selection abilities cancel out 
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the funds with superior managerial skills when evaluated on the aggregate level. To investigate 
individual funds' performance, Fama and French compared the distribution of the actual and 
bootstrapped t-statistic of alpha. The results reveal that when the returns are evaluated before 
expense costs, there is an indication of managerial skill for both out- and underperforming 
funds; however, only a few funds have enough skills to cover the costs when the returns are 
measured net of fees.  
There is an abundance of studies on performance persistence and its economic significance on 
the US mutual funds. However, scientific literature on the performance of Norwegian mutual 
funds is lacking. One of the most comprehensive studies using Norwegian data free of 
survivorship-bias was done by Sørensen (2009). He examined Norwegian mutual funds' 
performance and performance persistence between 1982 and 2008. He found no statistically 
significant abnormal returns over the returns obtained with Fama and French model. The 
bootstrapped results show only weak evidence of skill for the best performing funds and more 
substantial evidence of bad managerial skill for the worst performers. There is also no evidence 
for persistence among winners and losers. 
Despite the lack of academic literature on Norwegian mutual funds' performance persistence, 
there is adequate literature written to conduct proper performance evaluation and persistence 
study on the Norwegian stock market. The study can be of particular interest to investors in 
Norwegian mutual funds who are paying substantial fees to managers claiming to deliver 





3.1 Norwegian Mutual Funds  
The data on mutual funds are obtained from the Morningstar Direct database. The final sample 
includes 99 open-end equity funds that have ever existed from 1996 to 2019 and invested at 
least 80 percent in the Norwegian stock market. The restriction is required to examine the 
performance of Norwegian funds exclusively. The sample excludes index funds since actively 
managed funds are the ones that we are interested in investigating.  The actively managed 
funds pursue an active investment strategy and claim to deliver returns above the specified 
market benchmark.  
The number of monthly returns for the selected mutual funds varies from 13 to 288 
observations. The monthly return on Morningstar is constructed using the following formula: 
                                          𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡 − 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡−1
                                                                   
In which NAV is the monthly net asset value of the fund. All income and capital gain 
distributions during the period are assumed to be reinvested, while management, 
administrative, distribution, and other costs are deducted (Morningstar, 2020).  
3.2 Risk Factor Loadings 
We extract the Norwegian stock market's risk pricing factors from Bernt Arne Ødergaard's 
website to run Fama and French (1996) and Carhart (1997) benchmark models. Table 1 shows 










Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Risk Factors 
Both tables display statistics on the risk factors constructed by Bernt Ødegaard that are used 
in the regression analysis. Panel A shows the average monthly values of the factors in different 
time periods. The numbers in brackets are p values against the null hypothesis of observations 
being equal to zero. Panel B shows correlation statistics among the factors throughout the 
whole time period. OSEFX index is Rm, which is the proxy for market return. The choice of 
OSEFX as the market return is discussed in section 3.4. The returns are reported in percent.  
 
                       Panel A: Average values 
  1996-2019 1996-2003 2004-2011 2012-2019 
 SMB 0.62 (0.01) 1.13 (0.00) 0.30 (0.50) 0.44 (0.14) 
 HML -0.12 (0.64) 0.05 (0.92) -0.17 (0.66) -0.24 (0.49) 
 PR1YR 1.04 (0.00) 0.45 (0.41) 1.04 (0.02) 1.63 (0.00) 
  
Panel B: Correlations 
 Rm SMB HML PR1YR 
 
Rm 1    
SMB -0.47 1   
HML -0.2 -0.05 1  
PR1YR -0.22 0.15 -0.04 1 
 
3.3 Risk-free rate 
As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we use the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR)1. 
NIBOR reflects the interest rate required by lenders for unsecured money within two days of 
delivery. The rate is calculated as a simple average of submitted interest rates by NIBOR panel 
banks for each maturity (2020). Historical NIBOR rates are taken from the Norges Bank 
website for the period from 1995 to 2013, and from the Oslo Børs website for the period 2014-
2019 since Norges Bank and Oslo Børs were the official authorities responsible for calculating 
the money market interest rate. To transform the NIBOR rate to a monthly risk-free interest 
rate, we apply the following formula: 
                                                     (1 + 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅)1/12 − 1                                                        
 
1 Bernt Ødegaard also used NIBOR as a proxy for the interest rate in his studies of Norwegian stock market. 
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3.4 Market Return 
The market return can be typically obtained by getting the return of a value-weighted portfolio 
of all listed stocks. Although in case of the Norwegian stock market, the value-weighted 
portfolio might be formed only by a handful of big companies. For instance, Telenor, Statoil, 
and Norsk Hydro constituted 53% of the total stock market in 2006 (Næs et al., 2009). Hence, 
a choice of performance benchmark as a market portfolio proxy is crucial with the Norwegian 
stock market because depending on the choice, mutual funds' performance may vary 
drastically.  
Oslo Børs created a capped version of the benchmark investible index - OSEFX. The uncapped 
version of the index, OSEBX, represents all the shares listed on the Oslo stock exchange.  
OSEBX exhibits the problem mentioned above – some stocks can skew the overall 
performance of the index, which makes the index performance less representative of all stocks 
listed on the stock exchange. As shown in Table 2, OSEFX and OSEBX are highly correlated 
since OSEFX is constructed based on the OSEBX index. What is noticeable is that OSEFX is 
highly correlated with the value-weighted index. OSEFX index is like a version of the VW 
index that is constructed to comply with the restrictions for regulating investments in 
Norwegian mutual funds. We use OSEFX as the market proxy in our study since it is the most 
fitting index approximating the market return in Norway. OSEFX allows a maximum weight 
of the security to be 10% of the total market value of the index, and securities that exceed 5% 
cannot exceed 40% combined. The monthly returns of the OSEFX index for the period 1996-









Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Market Indexes 
The table illustrates statistics on different market indexes of the Oslo stock exchange. Panel A 
shows monthly returns in percentage terms for the overall and split time periods. Mean is the 
average value of monthly returns. St.d is the standard deviation in the sample of monthly 
returns. Min is the minimum value, while max represents the maximum value in the sample 
of monthly returns. Med denotes the median value in the sample of monthly returns. EW and 
VW are equal-weighted and value-weighted indexes constructed by Ødegaard using 
Norwegian market data. EW and VW indexes are presented in the table to compare the 
constructed indexes with OSEBX and OSEFX indexes. Panel B shows correlations among the 


























Panel A: Monthly returns of indexes  
Time period Index mean st.d min med max 
1996-2019 EW 1.33 10.07 -18.33 1.43 12.29 
 VW 1.66 12.26 -21.04 1.70 16.71 
 OSEBX 0.90 13.49 -25.22 1.12 15.83 
 OSEFX 0.91 14.35 -27.17 1.13 16.52 
1996-2003 EW 1.53 10.27 -18.33 2.12 12.29 
 VW 1.94 12.18 -20.55 2.31 16.71 
 OSEBX 0.78 13.10 -25.14 1.19 14.02 
 OSEFX 0.82 13.28 -25.42 1.30 14.24 
2004-2011 EW 1.36 9.37 -16.23 2.02 12.19 
 VW 1.79 11.95 -21.04 2.51 14.74 
 OSEBX 1.11 13.67 -25.22 1.82 15.83 
 OSEFX 1.04 14.53 -27.17 1.64 16.52 
2012-2019 EW 1.11 4.32 -6.83 0.85 6.31 
 VW 1.24 5.23 -7.90 1.51 8.26 
 OSEBX 0.81 5.47 -8.75 1.00 8.18 
 OSEFX 0.85 5.41 -8.83 0.72 7.86 
 
Panel B: Correlations   
 EW VW OSEBX OSEFX 
EW 1    
VW 0.9 1   
OSEBX 0.89 0.98 1  
OSEFX 0.9 0.97 0.99 1 
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3.5 Survivorship Bias 
The sample data includes all the funds that have ever existed for at least 12 months, from 1996 
to 2019. The inclusion of dead funds is crucial to conduct an accurate analysis of the mutual 
funds' performance in the specified time period. If a sample has only survived mutual funds, 
that sample's overall performance will be positively skewed and not entirely representative of 
the reality (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson & Ross, 1992).  Additionally, the studies conducted 
on the samples that exclude dead funds indicate predictability in the funds' returns (Brown et 
al., 1992; Carpenter & Lynch, 1999). Those mutual funds indicate performance persistence 
mainly due to survivorship bias rather than managerial ability to generate excess risk-adjusted 
returns (Malkiel, 1995). Therefore, we use survivorship bias-free data to avoid adverse effects 
when dead funds are excluded.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Measuring Performance  
One of the main questions in mutual fund literature is whether the active mutual fund managers 
can consistently beat the market and add value for investors. The initial step to address this 
question is to find a reliable proxy for measuring mutual funds' performance.  
The historical raw returns are widely used to measure the funds' performance. Carhart, who 
also used raw returns in his study, argues that although risk-adjusted returns are more likely 
to assess stock selection skills more accurately, the persistence estimation from the asset 
pricing model is exposed to model biases (Carhart, 1997).   
Despite concerns regarding the model biases, assessing mutual fund performance based on 
raw returns does not consider the level of risk taken by funds since high raw returns might be 
associated with higher risk. Therefore, the analysis based on raw returns can mislead investors 
to prefer the high-risk mutual funds over the low-risk ones to obtain higher returns while 
disregarding the investment riskiness. Blake and Timmermann (2003) explain the importance 
of using risk-adjusted returns in evaluating fund performance, performance persistence, and 
recognizing managers’ stock-picking ability. They argue that measuring performance without 
adjusting for risks may result in ranking funds based on their systematic risk level rather than 
the level of managers' stock selection ability. That is not in the best interest of risk-averse 
investors since riskier funds also have a high probability of underperforming. Moreover, 
replicating and implementing high-risk strategies does not require managerial skill, thus using 
raw returns is less likely to contribute to identifying funds’ manager superior skills.  Blake and 
Timmermann suggest that it is essential to provide investors with reliable performance 
analysis based on risk-adjusted returns to identify persistent underperformers and less-constant 
outperformers. It allows them to revise their investment strategies accordingly (Blake & 
Timmermann, 2003). Hence, it is crucial to assess fund performance based on risk-adjusted 
returns.  
We utilize both raw and risk-adjusted returns to attain a more precise estimation of the 
Norwegian mutual funds' performance and mitigate the biases that arise due to models' 
selection for measuring performance.   
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4.1.1 Risk-Adjusted Return 
Jensen's single-factor model (1968) is developed based on Sharpe's Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) that explains the relationship between risk and expected-returns for a given 
asset. In the Jensen model, the return in excess of the risk-free rate is adjusted for the market 
risk by including market risk exposure. The intercept of the model represents an abnormal 
return. A significant positive alpha implies the managers' ability to forecast equity prices, 
meaning that a captured return is higher than the expected return adjusted for risk exposure. 
In contrast, a negative alpha denotes mutual fund underperforming and perverse forecasting 
ability of fund managers.  
Even though the single-factor model defines an exact data generating process to describe the 
excess return produced by mutual funds managers, it only reflects market risk factors. Several 
scholars claim that Jensen's single-factor model does not measure the mutual funds' 
performance accurately since it only takes market proxy as the risk factor into account and it 
is not able to capture cross-sectional differences in average stock returns accurately (Elton et 
al.,1993; Fama & French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). Therefore, the single-factor model is not an 
appropriate benchmark to assess mutual funds' performance in producing an excess return.  
4.1.2 Fama and French 3-factor Model 
Multi-factor models are developed to address the problem that arose from the empirical 
evidence that a single market risk factor cannot fully explain expected returns. In light of that 
evidence, Fama and French examined Jensen's model using the US stock market data. They 
suggest that the market risk is not the only relevant risk factor to explain the returns, and other 
systematic risk factors also affect stock performance. Fama and French created their multi-
factor model by taking Jensen's model and adding two non-market risk factors to it; size factor 
(the higher average return of small-cap stocks relative to large-cap stocks) and book to market 
value factor (the higher average return of value stocks relative to growth stocks) (Fama & 
French, 1993).  
Fama and French argue that a 3-factor model can enhance the model's specification and ability 
to describe the typical variation in stock returns considerably compared to the single-factor 
model. Fama and French’s study indicates a robust negative relationship between stock returns 
and size - smaller firms are more likely to have higher average returns. It also reveals a 
substantial positive correlation between stock returns and book-to-market value ratio (Fama 
& French, 1992, 1993). 
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4.1.3 Carhart 4-factor Model  
Carhart argues that the 3-factor model is unable to explain cross-sectional variations in 
momentum-sorted portfolio returns. He developed a 4-factor model by using the Fama and 
French 3-factor model and adding a one-year momentum factor (PR1YR), which previously 
was introduced by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993). PR1YR defines the difference between the 
average returns of the past best-performing and worst-performing portfolios. Carhart's model 
reveals whether fund managers possess the stock-picking ability or outperform the market by 
merely following a zero-investment strategy of investing in a portfolio that would long stocks 
with the highest past one-year return and short stocks with the lowest past one-year return. 
The PR1YR factor indicates that the stocks that performed well in the prior year are expected 
to achieve higher returns relative to those that performed poorly (i.e., contrarian stocks) 
(Carhart, 1997).  
Carhart argues that the 4-factor model is more efficient in assessing the active mutual funds' 
performance against passive funds' performance since it captures the average return obtained 
from fundamental trading strategies that bet on stock’s beta, market capitalization size, book 
to market, and momentum factors. Therefore, Carhart's model serves as the most reliable 
benchmark to represent the passive funds' performance and deliver more precise alphas to 
evaluate active fund managers' stock selection ability (Carhart, 1997).  
We employ the Carhart 4-factor model as the primary model and the Fama and French 3-factor 
as the alternative model to measure the mutual funds' performance. Then, we discuss the 
ability of these two models to evaluate performance of actively managed Norwegian mutual 
funds.   
4.2 Bootstrapping Method 
The performance that has been measured by the asset pricing models does not reflect the role 
of luck in performance outcomes. It is expected that some funds beat the passive benchmark 
simply by chance or underperform the passive indices as a result of bad luck. The statistical 
inference of excess return obtained from the factor benchmark models is valid under OLS 
model assumptions. The validity is questioned with mutual funds' returns since the assumption 
of the normal distribution of residuals is violated (Kosowski et al., 2006). The combination of 
non-normality in both time-series of individual mutual fund returns and cross-section of 
 21 
mutual funds alpha makes t-statistics invalid to test the hypothesis of the existence of abnormal 
performance.  
For individual funds, non-normality in the distribution of residuals arises from skewness and 
kurtosis in the distribution of returns, time-series autocorrelations in returns, and dynamic 
investment strategies that lead to fluctuation in funds' risk-taking levels over time. The non- 
normality of individual fund alphas leads to nonnormality in the cross-section of fund alphas. 
Besides, the uneven distribution of risk-taking level among mutual funds affects the cross-
sectional distribution of alphas. When a large group of high-risk funds is present in the sample, 
the cross-sectional distribution of alphas is thicker than normal distribution in the tails, leading 
to over rejection of the null hypothesis of no true excess return. In contrast, when a large group 
of low-risk funds exists in the sample, the cross-sectional distribution of alphas is thinner in 
the tail resulting in under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no excess return (Kosowski et al., 
2006). 
To differentiate between luck and superior managerial skills in generating excess returns, we 
employ a bootstrap method that estimates the sample distribution of t-statistic without making 
assumptions about the underlying population. This method infers about the population 
parameter based on the sample statistic by multiple random resampling from the original 
sample data. The bootstrapping method provides a randomly constructed baseline of 
performance representing excess returns produced only by luck. This baseline is created by 
simulating the returns assuming that true alpha is equal to zero. By comparing the distribution 
of bootstrapped and actual estimates, we can answer whether over or underperforming is 
because of luck or managers' skill. If bootstrap iterations create far fewer extreme positive 
values of alphas or alphas t-statistics than the actual ones, it implies that luck is not the only 
source of high abnormal returns, and managers possess superior stock-selection skills to 
outperform the passive indices. 
We employ the bootstrapping method developed by Fama and French (2010) based on the 
initial bootstrapping method of Kosowski et al. (2006). The Kosowski method generates 
independent simulations for individual funds, while the Fama and French method run the 
simulations by jointly resampling the factor returns and residuals for all funds. This resampling 
method controls for the effects of correlated movement in 4-factor explanatory returns 
volatilities and residuals in the model. This modification captures any correlation across 
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estimated alphas arising from a benchmark model that does not capture all common variation 
in fund returns. (Fama & French, 2010). 
The findings of these methods indicate variation in the skill across actively managed mutual 
funds. Fama and French (2010) found no evidence of managerial skill, while Kosowski et al. 
(2006) detected a small number of skilled managers. Blake et al. (2017) compared the two 
approaches using the same dataset and survival rule to identify whether the different results 
come from the different research periods, distinct inclusion criteria, or the bootstrap 
methodology. By employing Kosowski et al. (2006) method, they detected a small number of 
funds with superior manager skills. However, they discovered a little indication of 
outperformance when jointly resampling the fund and factor returns, as suggested by Fama 
and French (2010). 
This comparison suggests that employing the Fama and French bootstrapping model controls 
for the systematic relationship between the funds' returns and the factor benchmarks in 
addition to non-systematic risk contained in the benchmark models' residuals. Therefore, by 
employing this method, we set marginally stricter measures when classifying funds' managers 
as "stars" with superior skills. (Blake et al., 2017). 
4.2.1 Fama and French Bootstrap Implementation 
We start by running the Carhart 4-factor model using individual funds' monthly returns across 
the study period and saving the actual estimated alphas, t-statistics of alphas, risk factors’ 
coefficients, and residuals. 
In the following step, a (𝑇 × 1)-dimension vector of a random sample of the monthly returns 
data point is drawn from the uniform distribution 𝑈𝑡(0,1) that produce values between 0 and 
1. This vector is multiplied by T, and its components round up to the nearest integer. This 
constructed matrix represents the ordering of monthly returns in the sample. 𝑇 denotes the 
number of periods in our sample (𝑇=288). It generates a matrix that represents a vector of time 
indices drown randomly and with replacement from the time points in the data set:  
 
𝑇𝑏 = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑇 × {𝑈𝑡(0,1)}𝑡=1
𝑇 )       𝑏 = 1, … ,10000 
 
In each simulation irritation, a new series of risk factors 𝐹(𝑇𝑏) with the dimension of (T×K) 
is created according to the drawn time indices, where K is the number of risk factors in the 
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model. The same procedure is repeated for the saved residuals obtained from the primary 
regression model by building a matrix of (T×N), where N is the total number of funds. Since 
the number of monthly return observations varies across funds and there some missing data in 
the sample, if the randomly draws produce less than 12 observations for a fund, it is not 
included in that bootstrap iteration.   
We generate a new series of funds' returns with the null hypothesis of zero alpha using the 
original estimates of coefficients for the risk factors along with the bootstrapped factor returns 
and residuals from simulations. The constructed funds' returns are regressed against the 
corresponding risk factors and generate 10000 alpha estimations and t-statistics of the alpha 
for each of the 99 funds. The average of the bootstrapped results represents how the funds 
perform (net of fees) when there is no managerial skill, and excess returns are created only by 
luck.  
Lastly, we compare the distribution of t(α) estimates from funds' returns with the distribution 
from bootstrap simulations to examine if luck or managers' skill generates the excess returns. 
We compare the average of all simulated t(α) and the actual estimates at the different 
percentiles to analyze the bootstrapped outcomes at various levels of funds' performance- from 
the worst-performing to the best performing funds.  
We also calculate the bootstrapped (p-value) of the estimations, which is the fraction of 10000 
simulations that produce alphas or t-statistic of the alphas greater than the actual estimates at 
different percentiles. We test the null hypothesis that true alpha is equal to zero using the 
bootstrapped p-values at 5% significance level. It means that for the right tail quintiles if less 
than 5% of the simulations produce t(α) above the actual t(α) estimate, we can conclude that 
some managers possess sufficient skills to attain positive excess returns. In contrast, if this 
fraction in the left tail quintiles exceeds 95%, we can argue that managers possess inferior 
skills to obtain excess returns above the passive benchmarks.  
4.3 Persistence Tests 
Research on performance persistence in mutual funds provides an essential methodology for 
studying the ability of actively managed funds to outperform the market and consistently 
attract new investors. Despite the extensive literature on mutual funds ‘performance 
persistence, previous studies demonstrate contradictory findings regarding the existence of 
persistence in actively managed mutual funds.  
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We test for performance persistence using three methodologies that are frequently found in 
the literature:  recursive portfolio test, contingency table, and cross-product ratio. 
4.3.1 Recursive Portfolio Formation Method 
We primarily assess the persistence in mutual fund performance by employing a recursive 
portfolio formation approach. This method has been used in several leading mutual 
performance studies written by Hendricks et al. (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1993), and 
Carhart (1997). Carpenter and Lynch examine the specification of different persistence tests 
in the absence of survivorship bias. They suggest that the recursive portfolio formation method 
is well-specified in measuring performance persistence, particularly for the top- and bottom-
ranked portfolios (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999).   
This method includes sorting the funds in quintiles based on their performance in the ranking 
period, forming equally weighted (EW) portfolios of mutual funds in each quintile, and then 
evaluating the performance of formed portfolios over the consequent holding period before a 
new portfolio is created based on the similar process.  
We measure the performance of the mutual funds based on risk-adjusted returns using the 
Carhart 4-factor model. The excess return is considered as a mutual fund's manager's ability 
to outperform the Carhart 4-factor benchmark. To obtain more reliable estimations from the 
model, we set a minimum 24 observations requirement for the ranking period and then extend 
it to 36 observations to examine how a longer ranking period will affect the persistence 
measurement. We rank funds based on both alphas and t-statistics of alphas obtained from the 
Carhart 4-factor model over the ranking period.  
We evaluate persistence for short and long time horizons by holding the constructed portfolios 
in each quintile in the subsequent 3 to 24 months. At the end of each holding period, we 
rebalance the portfolios according to lagged 24-months to 36-months alpha and t-statistics and 
repeat it for the whole study period. We follow the Carhart approach (1997) to control for the 
survivorship and look ahead bias by including the funds existing in ranking periods and 
terminating during holding periods. The EW returns of portfolios are readjusted for the funds 
that disappear based on the remaining funds in each quintile. Lastly, we examine performance 
persistence of mutual funds across each quintile by employing the Carhart 4-factor model for 
the time-series of portfolios' EW returns over the holding periods. We study the alphas to see 
if the best-performing quintile portfolios persistently outperform the benchmark and if the 
 25 
worst-performing quintile portfolios constantly underperform the benchmark model. We also 
examine statistical significance of an estimated alpha for quintile portfolios by using the 
bootstrapped p-value. The bootstrapped analysis gives an insight into whether quintile 
portfolios’ alphas are generated by luck or managerial skills. The significant quintile 
portfolios’ risk-adjusted returns imply that persistence or inconsistent performance is because 
of the fund managers' actions.   
4.3.2 Contingency Table 
We test the consistency in mutual fund ranking by constructing contingency tables of initial 
and subsequent 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month mutual fund rankings by following the 
Carhart approach (1997). We rank funds based on the annual raw returns net of fees for the 
12-month period and based on the Carhart 4-factor model's alphas for 24-month and 36-month 
periods.  
It is worth mentioning that ranking on raw returns may reflect the persistent systematic risk 
taken by fund managers while ranking on risk-adjusted returns differentiates managerial skill 
more precisely and picks up the model bias between ranking and subsequent periods. That is 
why we base our ranking both on raw and risk-adjusted returns. We expand the time-window 
from 12 to 36 months since the regression coefficients will be more meaningful with a longer 
time horizon and also because one-year persistence can be a noisy measure (Carhart, 1997).  
After ranking, we place the funds in quintile over an initial and subsequent time window. Then, 
we count the number of times a fund is observed in one of the quintiles in the subsequent 
period, conditional on its ranking over the initial period. Funds that disappear during the 
subsequent period are placed in a separate category for dead funds.  
The bars in the contingency table for initial rank i and subsequent rank represent the 
conditional probability of achieving a subsequent ranking of quintile j (or dying) given its 
initial ranking of i.  
4.3.3 Cross-Product Ratio 
The contingency tables in the previous section illustrate the mutual funds' performance 
persistence visually but do not demonstrate statistical significance of the results. Therefore, 
we employ the non-parametric test proposed by Brown and Goetzmann (1995), which applies 
a cross-product ratio (CPR) test to evaluate persistence in the sample.  
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By following this approach, we categorize the performance of mutual funds based on 12-
month net returns and based on the risk-adjusted 24-month and 36-month returns using the 
Carhart 4-factor model. The funds evaluated on raw net returns are categorized as winners and 
losers in the following way - a fund is a winner if its net return is greater than the median net 
return of all the funds in that period; otherwise, it is a loser. The funds assessed by the risk-
adjusted returns are categorized as winners if the fund's alpha is greater than the median risk-
adjusted return of all the funds in that period; otherwise, it is a loser. After categorizing the 
funds, we construct two-way contingency tables for each time interval that indicate the mutual 
fund's performance in two consecutive time periods. The funds are labeled as WW (LL) if they 
are winners (losers) over an initial and the following periods. If a fund is categorized as a 
winner (loser) in the first period and as a loser (winner) in the second period, the fund is 
defined WL (LW). The repeat performers imply funds performing persistently from the prior 
interval to the following interval, while reverse performers do not continuously remain in the 
same category at different intervals (Brown & Goetzmann, 1995).  
We aggregate the resulting contingency tables and conduct the following test on the 
aggregated absolute frequencies denoted by 𝑁𝑊𝑊 , 𝑁𝑊𝐿, 𝑁𝐿𝑊 and 𝑁𝐿𝐿 where the sum of the 
absolute frequencies is 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝐿 + 𝑁𝐿𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿. 
The cross-product ratio captures the odds ratio of the funds that persist in their performance to 
the ones that switch their performance in the subsequent period. The cross-product ratio (CPR) 
is calculated as follows: 
                                                           𝐶𝑃𝑅 =
𝑁𝑊𝑊 × 𝑁𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑊𝐿 × 𝑁𝐿𝑊
                                                                       
CPR is greater than one if the number of funds with the same performance in two consecutive 
periods is higher than the number of reverse performers. CPR being equal to one implies 
persistence in mutual funds' performance does not exist since, in the absence of persistence, 
four categories denoted by 𝑁𝑊𝑊 , 𝑁𝑊𝐿, 𝑁𝐿𝑊 and 𝑁𝐿𝐿 would have 25% of the total number of 
funds (Goetzmann & Ibbotson, 1994).  
We test the statistical significance of the CPR being equal to one under the null hypothesis 
representing the absence of persistence. Since the CPR is assumed to have the natural log 
form, Z-statistic is computed as below, using a natural log odds ratio and standard error of the 
natural logarithm of the CPR (Christensen, 1990). 
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                                                                      𝑍 =
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅)
𝜎ln (𝐶𝑃𝑅)
                                                                     
Thus, if the Z-statistic is greater than the critical value at 5% significance level, the null 
hypothesis is rejected in favor of the presence of persistence. 
To examine the robustness of the results, we also conduct a chi-square test (Agarwal & Naik, 
2000)  that examines the funds’ performance persistence by comparing the observed frequency 
distribution of 𝑁𝑊𝑊 , 𝑁𝑊𝐿, 𝑁𝐿𝑊 and 𝑁𝐿𝐿 with the expected frequency distribution. 
We obtain the chi-square statistic in the following way: 
















                    
Where 
 𝐷1 =
(𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝐿) × (𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝑊)
𝑁
, 𝐷2 =
(𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝐿) × (𝑁𝑊𝐿 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿)
𝑁
 ,                
  𝐷3 =
(𝑁𝐿𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿) × (𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝑊)
𝑁
,   𝐷4 =
(𝑁𝐿𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿) × (𝑁𝑊𝐿 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿)
𝑁




5.1 Measuring performance 
We start presenting the results in Table 3 by showing the performance of the EW portfolio of 
all fund returns, which is an overview of how mutual funds perform in aggregate when 
measured using OSEFX as a market proxy and regressed using CAPM, Fama and French 3-
factor, and Carhart 4-factor benchmarks.  
The market beta is statistically significant and close to one as expected since the sample 
represents the Norwegian market's return as we imposed the restriction of investing solely in 
Norwegian equities. SMB factor is statistically significant and positive in all models, which 
means that the EW portfolio's return can be partially explained by exposure to the SMB risk 
factor. SMB factor is positive, indicating that on average, funds bet on small over big 
capitalization equities. HML factor is negative, demonstrating that, on average, funds prefer 
low book-to-market over high book-to-market stocks. Nevertheless, since the HML factor is 
close to zero and significant only at 10% in Fama and French model and insignificant in the 
Carhart model, the funds have little to no exposure to the risk factor. PR1YR factor is 
insignificant; thus, the EW portfolio of mutual fund returns cannot be explained by the 
momentum factor. The regression models used have high explanatory power, which is fairly 
similar across the models since the Fama and French and Carhart models have the same 
adjusted R-squared. At the aggregate level, market, SMB, and to a small extent, HML risk 
factors explain the mutual funds' returns. All of the alphas obtained are insignificant, meaning 
that the EW portfolio of mutual funds fails to deliver the returns in excess of those explained 
by the benchmarks.  
Our aggregate results are aligned with the findings of Bernt Ødergaard (2009), who discovered 
that HML and momentum factors are irrelevant in the Norwegian stock market. Similarly, 
Fama and French (2010) showed that the US mutual funds have little exposure to HML and 
momentum factors, in aggregate. Additionally, our finding that the aggregate portfolio of 
mutual funds generates no excess returns for investors is similar to the findings made in the 
previous studies on the US market, for instance, in Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), and Fama 
and French (2010).  
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Table 3: Aggregate Fund Performance 
The table displays alphas, market exposure coefficients, risk factor coefficients, and the 
adjusted R-squared values obtained from the regressions on aggregate EW portfolio of excess 
monthly fund returns. The values in brackets are corresponding t-statistics that were adjusted 
with the Newey-West procedure to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey 
& West, 1987). The alphas are in percent per year. The sample period is from 1996 to 2019.  
Model ɑ  SMB L PR1YR Adj.R
2 
CAPM 0.89  0.94***  
   
0.97  
(1.25) (55.52) 
    
       
Fama&French -0.60  0.98*** 0.15*** -0.02*  
 
0.98  
(-1.01) (70.35) (10.38) (-1.68) 
  
       
Carhart -0.69  0.98***  0.15*** -0.02  0.01  0.98  
(-1.15) (71.04) (10.81) (-1.53) (0.50) 
 
Significance codes: p=1% (***), p=5% (**), p=10% (*)     
 
To examine Norwegian mutual funds' average performance over time, we illustrate rolling and 
extending alpha estimation with a window of 36-month returns in Figure 1. The upper panel 
reports the alpha obtained from the Fama and French 3-factor model, while the lower panel 
shows the alpha estimation from the Carhart 4-factor model. The left graph in each panel 
indicates alphas for the rolling window, whereas the right graph represents alphas for the 
extending window. From Panel A1, the 3-factor estimations of alpha in the rolling window 
had been growing from -0.02 to 0.02%. The rolling window alpha estimations in Panel B1 
display a similar trend; however, the 4-factor model's alphas are smaller than the alphas of the 
3-factor model during the rise and fall from 2015 to 2018. It infers that the difference in alphas 
can be partially explained by the momentum factor captured by the Carhart model throughout 
this period.  
Looking at Panel A2 and Panel B2, we observe that extending window alpha estimates at an 
aggregate level from the 3-factor and 4-factor models are identical and below zero over time. 
The similar alphas of both models indicate that the PR1YR risk factor is not significant at the 







Figure 1: Rolling and Extending Window Alphas of the Equally 
Weighted Portfolio 
Panel A1: Rolling window 3-factor alphas             Panel A2: Extending window 3-factor alphas 
 
Panel B1: Rolling window 4-factor alphas             Panel B2: Extending window 4-factor alphas   
 
This figure displays alpha estimates of the equal-weighted portfolio of all mutual fund returns 
with the window width of 36 months. Panel A reports the alphas of the Fama and French 3-
factor model, and Panel B reports the alphas of the Carhart 4-factor model. In each panel, the 
left graph represents rolling window alpha estimates, and the right graph represents extending 
window alpha estimates. The solid line indicates the alpha estimates, while the dotted line is 
the Newey-West-corrected two standard error bands. The sample period is 1996 to 2019. The 






5.2 Luck versus skill in the mutual fund returns 
Our finding that the Norwegian mutual funds do not deliver excess returns above the passive 
benchmarks at an aggregate level might not be robust. Additionally, some individual funds 
may deliver abnormal returns above the specified risk factors. To test robustness of the 
obtained results and establish if any funds deliver abnormal returns, we employ the Fama and 
French's (2010) bootstrap simulation method. The procedure aims to detect any abnormal 
returns and whether those returns are the consequence of managerial skill or simply luck. The 
results of the bootstrap procedure are presented in Table 4. Fama and French advise using 
simulation on the t-statistics rather than alpha estimates due to differences in the number of 
observations and residual variance. Since the t-statistic of alpha reflects precision with which 
alpha is obtained, it is viewed as a more reliable estimate. We are following the researchers' 
recommendations but present the results based both on alphas and t-statistics.  
The results show that the simulated alphas of the four worst performers and extreme 
percentiles of the worst-performing funds are above the actual estimates in at least 90% of the 
cases. The result indicates underperformance of the worst-performing mutual funds, which is 
due to lack of skill rather than luck. The rest of percentile portfolios and the best performing 
funds have insignificant alphas; thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, and the true value 
of the alphas is zero. Nonetheless, as we have established earlier, the simulation results on t-
statistics are more reliable. 
The simulation on t-statistics presents the results that are more promising for the worst-
performing funds but are also less favorable for the best performers. The worst performing 
funds show no significant results since the number of simulated t-statistics above the actual 
estimate is mostly below 90%. The percent of simulated values above the actual estimate 
among the best performers increased compared to the value with alpha estimates, which 
indicates even less evidence of skill for the best performers. Nonetheless, all of the percentile 
portfolios, along with the worst and best funds, show insignificant performance at 5% 
significance level. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero alpha for those 
funds.  
What is important to note is that we are using returns net of fees, which we obtained from the 
Morningstar database. Thus, we cannot say if managers have sufficient skills and can produce 
excess returns before charging a management fee. The bootstrap analysis displays evidence of 
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weak managerial skill based on bootstrapped alpha and no skill according to bootstrapped t-
statistic among the Norwegian fund managers.  
Table 4: Bootstrap Analysis of the Mutual Funds Returns 
The table presents the actual and bootstrap simulated alphas produced with the Carhart 4-
factor model along with the actual and bootstrap simulated t-statistics of the Norwegian mutual 
funds. The first column shows for which funds the estimates are presented - five worst-
performing funds, 1 to 99% deciles of the funds, and five best-performing funds. Simulated 
column displays the average values across 10000 simulations for the specified fund or 
percentile. Sim>Act column illustrates how many of the mutual funds' simulated estimates are 
above the actual estimates. The bold estimates in the column indicate 5% significance level. 
The t-statistics were adjusted with the Newey-West procedure to account for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity (Newey & West, 1987). The alphas are monthly and in percent.  The 
sample period is from 1996 to 2019. 
  Alphas t-statistics 
  Actual Simulated Sim>Act Actual Simulated Sim>Act 
Worst -0,87% -0,59% 88,50% -3,23 -2,77 77,32% 
2nd -0,70% -0,45% 91,78% -2,81 -2,24 82,27% 
3rd -0,63% -0,39% 93,13% -2,76 -2,01 89,74% 
4th -0,55% -0,34% 94,02% -2,45 -1,84 86,38% 
5th -0,55% -0,30% 96,72% -2,41 -1,72 90,01% 
1% -0,79% -0,53% 90,37% -3,02 -2,52 79,24% 
2% -0,67% -0,43% 92,54% -2,79 -2,14 85,78% 
3% -0,59% -0,37% 93,77% -2,61 -1,94 88,16% 
4% -0,55% -0,33% 95,38% -2,43 -1,79 87,96% 
5% -0,49% -0,29% 95,27% -2,38 -1,68 90,46% 
10% -0,26% -0,20% 79,90% -1,92 -1,29 90,58% 
20% -0,16% -0,11% 79,66% -1,18 -0,85 77,76% 
30% -0,11% -0,07% 81,45% -0,89 -0,53 79,86% 
40% -0,07% -0,03% 75,97% -0,55 -0,27 75,23% 
50% -0,03% 0,00% 74,40% -0,25 -0,03 70,47% 
60% 0,01% 0,03% 64,85% 0,07 0,22 64,00% 
70% 0,04% 0,06% 59,88% 0,40 0,49 57,11% 
80% 0,12% 0,10% 40,76% 0,86 0,80 43,65% 
90% 0,24% 0,19% 25,28% 1,29 1,25 44,47% 
95% 0,37% 0,28% 19,27% 1,70 1,64 42,85% 
96% 0,40% 0,32% 21,22% 1,87 1,76 39,23% 
97% 0,42% 0,36% 29,45% 2,06 1,92 36,61% 
98% 0,50% 0,41% 24,72% 2,26 2,11 36,34% 
99% 0,60% 0,51% 27,89% 2,32 2,46 50,87% 
5th 0,39% 0,30% 17,87% 1,83 1,68 36,09% 
4th 0,41% 0,33% 23,04% 1,90 1,81 40,56% 
3rd 0,42% 0,38% 33,17% 2,21 1,99 32,19% 
2nd 0,57% 0,44% 19,29% 2,30 2,21 39,65% 
Best 0,62% 0,57% 34,33% 2,34 2,70 58,32% 
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Figure 2 illustrates the Cumulative Density Functions (CDFs) of simulated and actual 4-factor 
alphas and alpha t-statistics in Panel A and B, respectively. The graph in Panel A indicates 
that in the left tail of performance, there is less probability mass for the actual distribution than 
the bootstrap distribution, which means there are weak-performing funds' managers whose 
actions lead to true negative alphas. However, in the right tail at 80% percentile till 98% 
percentile there is some indication of superior managerial skills to beat the passive benchmark.  
In Panel B, we observe similar results for the left tail that implies true inferior managerial 
skills. In contrast, in the right tail, the actual t-statistics of alpha estimations are close to 
simulation results, suggesting that some fund managers possess only adequate skills to 
generate risk-adjusted returns to cover the fees, but they do not have superior stock-picking 
abilities to outperform the passive indices. 
Figure 2: Empirical Cumulative Density Functions for Simulated and 
Actual 4-factor Alphas and t-statistics  
Panel A: Simulated and Actual CDF of Alphas  
 
Panel B: Simulated and Actual CDF of t-statistics  
 
The figure shows the actual and average simulated CDFs of the 4-factor Carhart model alphas 
and the corresponding t-statistics for the net returns. The solid line represents the actual 
values, while the dotted line represents the simulated values. The sample period is from 1996 
to 2019.  
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5.3 Performance Persistence 
Findings in the previous section demonstrate that the Norwegian mutual funds generally fail 
to deliver positive excess returns to investors over the study period. Nevertheless, performance 
persistence analysis may reveal that a group of funds persistently outperform the benchmark 
and thus be of interest to investors since they can identify the best performing persistent funds 
in advance and receive excess returns.  
We present performance persistence of the portfolios of mutual funds ranked on lagged 1-year 
returns in Table 4. The portfolios do not demonstrate substantial variation in the returns, 
particularly with the Fama and French 3-factor model. Overall, the coefficients of 1-5 spread 
portfolio are insignificant, and the portfolio has low explanatory power of the returns. In 
contrast to the spread portfolio with Fama and French, the spread 1-5 Carhart portfolio has 
higher explanatory power of 11%. Additionally, the market and momentum risk factors are 
highly significant and explain the variation in the returns between the top and bottom quintile 
funds. 
What is noteworthy is that the momentum risk factor is highly significant for the best and 
worst-performing quintile portfolios created using Carhart 4-factor model. The best portfolio 
of funds has positive PR1YR, meaning that the funds follow the momentum strategy of 
longing top past year performers and shorting worst past year performers. The worst portfolio 
of funds has negative PR1YR, which means the funds failed the same strategy, possibly due 
to a reversal of top winners' performance.  
The yearly alphas do not differ from zero for all of the portfolios except for portfolio 5 in Fama 
and French that is being significant at 10% significance level. However, significance 
disappears after the inclusion of the momentum factor, which partially explains the alpha 
intercept presented in the 3-factor model. Therefore, there is no indication of yearly 
performance persistence in our analysis of Norwegian mutual funds. The finding clashes with 
the one that Carhart got: the alpha of the spread portfolio between the best and worst-
performing US mutual funds is highly significant, thus displays one-year persistence in the 




Table 5: Portfolios of Mutual Funds Grouped on Lagged 1-year Return 
The table shows returns, alphas, market exposure coefficients, risk factor coefficients, and the 
adjusted R-squared values derived from the regressions on 6 portfolios, including the spread 
portfolio. The alphas are in percent per year. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio of the top-performing 
funds, portfolio 2 is the portfolio of the next best performing funds, and so on until portfolio 
5, which is the worst-performing funds portfolio. 1-5 spread is the hypothetical portfolio of 
buying top-performing portfolios and shorting worst-performing portfolios aimed to highlight 
the differences between the two. The table has two panels: one displays the results from Fama 
and French regression model, and the other shows the results from the Carhart 4-factor 
regression model. The values in brackets are corresponding t-statistics that were adjusted with 
the Newey-West procedure to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey & 
West, 1987). The sample period is from 1996 to 2019. 
Panel A: Fama and French 3-factor model 
  
Portfolio ɑ  SMB L Adj.R2 
1 -0.46 1.01*** 0.22*** -0.02 0.94  
(-0.47) (64.35) (6.80) (-1.19) 
 
2 -0.40 0.99*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.97  
(-0.44) (62.22) (5.48) (0.54) 
 
3 -0.63 0.98*** 0.08*** -0.03*** 0.97  
(-0.96) (64.02) (5.63) (-2.10) 
 
4 -0.78 0.99*** 0.13*** -0.03 0.97  
(-1.07) (49.13) (5.81) (-1.47) 
 
5 -1.79* 0.96*** 0.19*** -0.02 0.94  
(-1.95) (35.57) (6.06) (-0.66) 
 
1-5  1.33 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 
spread (0.95) (1.40) (0.45) (-0.81)   
Significance codes: p=1% (***), p=5% (**), p=10% (*) 
 
 
Panel B: Carhart 4-factor model 
Portfolio ɑ  SMB L PR1YR Adj.R2 
1 -1.44 1.03*** 0.21*** -0.02 0.07*** 0.95  
(-1.44) (70.20) (7.72) (-0.87) (3.27) 
 
2 -0.67 0.99*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.02 0.97  
(-0.78) (64.66) (5.34) (0.70) (1.56) 
 
3 -0.89 0.98*** 0.08*** -0.03* 0.02 0.97  
(-1.41) (65.30) (5.52) (-1.87) (1.10) 
 
4 -0.31 0.98*** 0.13*** -0.03* -0.03* 0.97  
(-0.39) (49.95) (6.39) (-1.67) (-1.82) 
 
5 -0.96 0.96*** 0.20*** 0.00 -0.06*** 0.94  
(-0.87) (37.05) (6.98) (-0.08) (-2.96) 
 
1-5  -0.48 0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.14*** 0.11 
spread (-0.37) (2.55) (0.38) (-0.49) (5.38) 
 
Significance codes: p=1% (***), p=5% (**), p=10% (*) 
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5.4 Recursive Portfolio 
In this section, we form recursive portfolios to identify performance persistence in mutual 
funds. We analyze performance of equally weighted (EW) quintile portfolios created by 
ranking the funds based on lagged the 24-month and 36-month alpha and corresponding t-
statistic of alpha obtained from the Carhart 4-factor model. The EW portfolios are rebalanced 
after 3, 6, 12, and 24-month holding periods and this procedure is repeated over the whole 
time period. We examine performance of the EW quintile portfolios to identify how persistent 
these portfolios are in generating positive or negative alphas. We employ the Carhart 4-factor 
model to evaluate the risk-adjusted return of portfolios and then apply a bootstrapped method 
to test whether persistence or inconsistent performance arises due to luck or managers’ stock-
picking abilities.  
Tables 6 reports the results of the recursive portfolio method when funds are ranked and placed 
in the top to bottom quintiles based on their alphas. Panel A and B show the results based on 
36 and 24 ranking periods, respectively, for quintiles 1 to 5, where the first quintile denotes 
the portfolios containing the best-performing funds, and the fifth quintile includes the worst-
performing funds over the ranking period. We also construct 1-5 spread quintile, a hypothetical 
self-financing quintile2 that represents the trading strategy of longing the best-performers and 
shorting the worst-performers. The column estimates are the Carhart 4-factor model alpha and 
Fama and French (2010) bootstrapped p-value3 of alpha for 3 to 24-month holding periods. 
The bootstrapped p-value of alpha indicates if the true risk-adjusted return of quintiles 
 
2 It is a hypothetical portfolio since Norwegian mutual funds are not able to short-sell shares. Moreover, 
self-financing refers to zero investment trading strategy which is about longing past-winners and 
shorting past-losers. By adding spread portfolio, we are differentiating the estimates between top and 
bottom quintile.  
3 For the right tail of alphas bootstrapped p-value is equal to the percentage of simulated alphas that 
are greater than actual alphas and for the left tail of alphas the bootstrapped p-value is equal to the 
percentage of simulated alpha that is smaller than actual alpha. 
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portfolios is different from zero and whether it is generated by managerial skill (lack of skill) 
or luck to persistently over-perform (under-perform) over time. 
The results in Table 6 indicate that there is no evidence of persistence in obtaining excess 
return over the benchmark for the top quintile of Norwegian mutual funds. The past-winner 
funds generate negative alpha in the holding periods up to 6 months for both 24-months and 
36-months ranking period. This under-performance has a significant bootstrapped p-value at 
5% level, suggesting that this negative return is due to the managers' lack of skill, not bad luck. 
By looking at Panel A, we find a positive risk-adjusted return of 0.19% for the 24-month 
holding period; however, it is not statistically significant. The bootstrapped p-value implies 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that true excess return is equal to zero, indicating this 
excess return is produced by luck. 
The results for bottom quintiles denote performance persistence for poor-performing funds in 
both Panels A and B. The excess return of the bottom quintile portfolio for all holding periods 
from 3 to 24 months is negative, with a significant bootstrapped p-value. It means that past-
loser funds remain losers due to bad managerial skills. We reject the null hypothesis that 
persistence in underperforming is a result of bad luck. In panel B, for the shortest and the most 
extended holding period, 3 and 24 months, respectively, alpha is around -2%, which is the 
most significant magnitude among all holding periods.   
Comparing the results in panel A and B, we find that for 24 months ranking period, the 
absolute value of negative alphas is greater than the value for the panel B for all holding 
periods in quintile 1 to 5. The significant excess returns in the spread quintile suggest that the 
difference between the best and worst funds' performance is meaningful; however, this trading 
strategy cannot be utilized by the Norwegian mutual funds' managers. 
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Table 6: Performance Persistence across Quintile Portfolios Formed 
on Lagged Alpha 
This table shows annualized alphas and bootstrapped p-values from the Carhart 4-factor 
model for individual quintile portfolio (1 to 5), and for the spread portfolio (long in quintile 
1 and short in quintile 5) using different lengths of ranking and holding periods. Quintile 1 
represents the best-performing mutual funds portfolios, and quintile 5 represents the 
portfolios of the worst-performing mutual funds during the portfolio formation period. The 
portfolios are equally weighted of monthly returns, and the weights are rebalanced whenever 
a fund dies to eliminate survivorship bias. In Panel A (B), the alpha and bootstrap p-value 
of alpha are reported for portfolios of ranked mutual funds based on lagged 36 (24) months 
alpha and held for different holding periods (3, 6, 12, and 24-month periods). The bold p-
values indicate significance at 5% confidence level. The procedure of ranking, portfolio 
forming, and holding repeated throughout the entire sample period (1998-2019).  
  
   Holding Period    
  3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 
Quintiles Alpha p-value Alpha p-value Alpha p-value Alpha p-value 
Panel A: 36 months ranking period       
1 -1.10% 0.00 -1.19% 0.00 -0.36% 0.12 0.19% 0.27 
2 -0.08% 0.40 -0.20% 0.22 -0.66% 0.01 -1.08% 0.00 
3 -0.17% 0.24 0.09% 0.36 -0.25% 0.16 -0.60% 0.01 
4 -0.01% 0.49 -0.42% 0.06 0.13% 0.32 -0.23% 0.23 
5 -2.04% 0.00 -1.37% 0.00 -1.76% 0.00 -1.88% 0.00 
1-5 spread 0.95% 0.02 0.19% 0.33 1.40% 0.00 2.08% 0.00 
Panel B: 24 months ranking period       
1 -0.61% 0.02 -0.99% 0.00 -1.38% 0.00 -1.03% 0.00 
2 -0.36% 0.05 -0.85% 0.00 -0.63% 0.00 -0.45% 0.04 
3 -0.75% 0.00 0.01% 0.49 -0.43% 0.03 -0.21% 0.15 
4 -0.53% 0.04 -1.32% 0.00 -0.46% 0.06 -0.66% 0.02 
5 -2.32% 0.00 -1.50% 0.00 -1.91% 0.00 -2.30% 0.00 
1-5 spread 1.71% 0.00 0.51% 0.09 0.53% 0.07 1.27% 0.00 
 
Table 7 represents the results of the recursive portfolio method when funds are ranked and 
placed in quintiles based on the t-statistics of alphas. Aligned with the findings in Table 6, the 
negative risk-adjusted returns for the top quintile suggest that past-winners do not remain 
winners in the next ranking period, and consequently, there is no evidence of persistence of 
the best-performers in obtaining an excess return. The alpha of the top quintile portfolios for 
the 36-months ranking period and 24-months holding period is equal to 0.29%; however, it is 
not significant at 5% confidence level, meaning that we fail to reject that true excess return is 
equal to zero.  
The outcome of bootstrapped simulation in Table 7 displays persistence among past losers 
both in Panel A and B, but the magnitude of the absolute value of negative alphas is greater 
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with the 24 months ranking period. Besides, the alphas of the bottom quintile portfolio suggest 
that for the shortest and longest holding periods, 3 and 24 months, respectively, persistence in 
generating a negative risk-adjusted return is stronger. The p-value is significant at 5% 
confidence level, which implies that weak performance is not due to bad luck, but because of 
bad managerial performance. 
Comparing Tables 6 and 7, we find the results for both ranking approaches are almost similar, 
suggesting that past-winner funds are not able to repeat their performance in the consequent 
period neither in the short nor in the long term. While past-losers, especially in the bottom 
quintile, exhibit persistence in generating negative risk-adjusted returns throughout all holding 
periods.  
Table 7: Performance Persistence across Quintile Portfolios Formed on 
the t-statistics of Lagged Alpha 
This table reports annualized alphas and bootstrapped p-values of the Carhart 4-factor model 
for each quintile portfolio (1 to 5), and for the spread portfolio (long in quintile 1 and short in 
quintile 5) using different lengths of ranking and holding periods. Quintile 1 represents the 
portfolios of best-performing mutual funds, and quintile 5 represents the portfolios of worst-
performing mutual funds during the portfolio formation period. The portfolios are equally 
weighted of monthly returns, and the weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears to 
avoid survivorship bias. In Panel A (B), the alpha and bootstrap p-value of alpha are reported 
for portfolios of ranked mutual funds based on t-statistic of lagged 36 (24) months alpha and 
held for different holding periods 3, 6, 12, and 24-month periods. The bold p-values indicate 
significance at 5% confidence level. The procedure of ranking, portfolio forming, and holding 
repeated throughout the entire sample period (1998-2019). 
    
Holding Period 
   
  3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 
Quintiles Alpha p-value Alpha p-value Alpha p-value Alpha p-value 
Panel A: 36 months ranking period  
     
1 -0.43% 0.07 -0.72% 0.02 -0.29% 0.18 0.29% 0.19 
2 -0.15% 0.32 -0.09% 0.39 -0.10% 0.37 -0.40% 0.09 
3 -0.33% 0.13 -0.61% 0.02 -0.55% 0.04 -0.64% 0.01 
4 -1.32% 0.00 -0.80% 0.01 -1.21% 0.00 -1.23% 0.00 
5 -1.13% 0.00 -0.90% 0.01 -0.81% 0.02 -1.54% 0.00 
1-5 spread 0.70% 0.03 0.18% 0.29 0.52% 0.06 1.83% 0.00 
Panel B: 24 months ranking period  
     
1 -0.27% 0.17 -0.82% 0.00 -1.00% 0.00 -1.38% 0.00 
2 -1.12% 0.00 -0.78% 0.00 -0.55% 0.02 -0.63% 0.00 
3 -0.58% 0.02 -0.12% 0.32 -0.60% 0.01 -0.43% 0.03 
4 -0.23% 0.22 -1.75% 0.00 -1.14% 0.00 -0.46% 0.06 
5 -2.23% 0.00 -1.03% 0.00 -1.49% 0.00 -1.91% 0.00 
1-5 spread 1.96% 0.00 0.22% 0.25 0.49% 0.08 0.53% 0.07 
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5.5 Contingency Table 
We employ a contingency table as a non-parametric approach to test if the track record of 
mutual funds returns can be used to predict performance in the subsequent period. Carhart 
(1997) suggests this approach to examine consistency in fund ranking by forming a 
contingency table of initial and following 12-month funds' rankings. We compare the net 
returns of 24 separate one-year periods and observe how funds move across the quintile 
portfolio from the initial period to the following one. The results of the constructed 
contingency table are illustrated in Figure 3, in which the bars for initial rank i and subsequent 
rank j denote the conditional probability of gaining a subsequent ranking of quintile j (or 
dying) given an initial ranking of quintile i.   
Figure 3 indicates that the funds in the top, second, third, and bottom quintiles are more likely 
to repeat the performance in the following year; however, losers have the highest likelihood 
among all the funds to continue as losers in the subsequent period. Furthermore, last year 
losers have the highest probability of disappearing in the subsequent period. However, a high 
likelihood of funds disappearing in the second quintile might suggest that the perishing of the 
funds occurs randomly, and it happens due to unobserved factors rather than performance of 
a fund in the preceding period.  
We also construct the contingency table in which mutual funds are ranked in quintiles based 
on the risk-adjusted returns to include the risk-taking level of funds' managers in assessing 
performance persistence. In this approach, the alphas of the Carhart 4-factor model are 
estimated for the subsequent 24-month and 36-month periods and then ranked in quintiles in 
each period. Similarly to the previous Figure 3, the bars indicate the Pr (rank j next interval | 
rank i last interval). The results for 24-month and 36-month intervals are presented in Figure 
4A and 4B, respectively.  
The findings for the risk-adjusted returns in the 24-month time intervals imply that loser funds 
in quintile four and five have a higher probability to either repeat the lousy performance or 
disappear. In contrast, winner funds have a higher likelihood of switching to the bottom 
quintile in the following period, which can be an indication of what Carhart described as 
gambling behavior by mutual funds (Carhart, 1997) 
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Figure 2: Contingency Table of Initial and Subsequent 12-month 
Performance Rankings 
In this figure, the funds are ranked into quintile portfolios based on the lagged 12-month net 
returns from 1996 to 2019. These initial quintile rankings are compared with the subsequent 
quintile rankings. Funds that do not survive the entire subsequent year are categorized in a 
separate classification for dead funds. The bars in a cell (j, i) indicate conditional probability 
(rank j next period | rank i last period).  
Similar to the 24-months risk-adjusted contingency table, the table for the 36-month alphas 
reveals performance persistence across worst-performing funds. It means that the worst-
performers are more likely to either show poor performance or disappear in the following 
period. Contrastingly, top-ranked funds in the 36-months contingency table show less reverse 
performance than in the 24-months contingency table.  
The findings of contingency tables of risk-adjusted returns are in line with the recursive 
portfolio approach that indicates past-losers remain losers, while winners are less likely to 
experience positive persistence over time. Compared to the analysis in the contingency table 
of risk-adjusted returns, the outcome of the raw net return contingency table shows that funds 
in quintiles 1 to 4  are almost equally likely to remain in the same quintile in the subsequent 





Figure 3: Contingency Table of Initial and Subsequent 24-month and 36-month 
Adjusted Returns Rankings 
A: 24-month time interval                                     B: 36-month time interval                                          
In this figure, the funds are ranked into quintiles based on alphas of the Carhart 4-factor model 
in the subsequent 24-month and 36-month time intervals. The initial quintile rankings are 
compared with the subsequent quintile rankings. Funds that do not survive the entire 
subsequent intervals are categorized in a separate classification for dead funds. The bars in the 
cell (j, i) denote the conditional probability of gaining a subsequent ranking of quintile j (or 
dying) given an initial ranking of quintile i.     
5.6 Cross-product Ratio 
While the contingency table illustrated negative performance persistence in the worst-
performing quantiles of funds, cross-product ratio and the corresponding Z and Chi-squared 
statistics can not only detect persistence but also show whether the persistence is statistically 
significant. 
In this section, we categorize a mutual fund every year as either a winner if the fund's raw 
annual return is above the median performer in the corresponding year or a loser if the raw 
annual return is below the median performer. After that, we calculate how many funds repeat 
or switch their performance in the following period and compile the number of WW, LL, WL, 
and LW throughout the whole sample period. By doing that, we obtain CPR, Z-statistics, and 
Chi-square statistics by following the methodology described previously. The results are 
presented in Table 8.  
In most time periods and with the total sample period, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
CPR being equal to one, which means there is no indication of performance persistence. 
 43 
However, in some periods, the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning there is performance 
persistence in several years. It is essential to point out that roughly half of the significant 
estimates are attributed to a reverse in performance. For instance, in years 1997-98 and 1998-
99, most of the winner funds became losers, while most of the loser funds became winners; 
thus, the switch in performance is not a sign of performance persistence. Therefore, only in 4 
out of 23 years, there is evidence of performance persistence. Nevertheless, since we are using 
raw returns, we cannot argue conclusively if the persistence comes from the managers' stock-
picking abilities or lack thereof or simply because some managers take more systematic risks, 
which is rewarded with persistent returns.  
 
Table 8: Performance Persistence Patterns on Raw Returns 
The table reports cross-product ratios (CPR), Z-statistics (Z-statistic), and Chi-square statistics 
(2) obtained by using annual raw returns net of fees. The total sample represents the values 
calculated for the whole time period from 1996 to 2019. The asterisks represent different 
significance levels – (***) is 1%, (**) is 5%, and (*) is 10%.  
 
Time period CPR Z-statistic 2 
1996-97 2.70 1.29 1.71 
1997-98 0.09 -2.92*** 9.53*** 
1998-99 0.17 -2.57*** 7.04*** 
1999-00 4.00 2.12** 4.67** 
2000-01 6.48 2.85*** 8.71*** 
2001-02 1.50 0.71 0.51 
2002-03 0.34 -1.97** 3.96** 
2003-04 0.54 -1.17 1.38 
2004-05 2.38 1.65* 2.76 
2005-06 1.30 0.51 0.26 
2006-07 3.64 2.39** 5.93** 
2007-08 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2008-09 0.34 -2.04** 4.27** 
2009-10 2.13 1.42 2.03 
2010-11 0.25 -2.60*** 7.01*** 
2011-12 0.52 -1.34 1.80 
2012-13 1.94 1.34 1.80 
2013-14 1.60 0.96 0.93 
2014-15 6.86 3.40*** 12.54*** 
2015-16 0.68 -0.75 0.57 
2016-17 2.96 2.16** 4.77** 
2017-18 0.59 -1.09 1.19 
2018-19 2.25 1.72* 3.00* 
Total sample 1.17 1.39 1.95 
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Since we would like to differentiate performance persistence better, we have also obtained 
CPR, Z-statistics, and Chi-square statistics using risk-adjusted returns, which is recommended 
in the literature (Brown & Goetzmann, 1995). We categorize a mutual fund every 24 and 36 
months as either a winner if the fund's alpha is above the median alpha in the corresponding 
time period or a loser if the alpha is below the median estimate. The alphas are produced by 
applying the Carhart 4-factor model, which is the reason why we use at least 24 months in the 
analysis to produce meaningful estimates. After categorizing the funds, we follow the same 
methodology as described previously to obtain the statistics presented in Table 9.  
When the returns are adjusted, most of the performance persistence disappears. In most time 
periods and with the total samples both for 24 and 36 months returns, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of CPR being equal to one; thus, there is no performance persistence. With the 24-
months window, we reject the null for the period from 2000 to 2001, which indicates 
performance persistence for that period. Additionally, there is a reverse in performance from 
2014 to 2015. With the 36-months window, we reject the null and claim performance 
persistence for a more extensive period from 1999 to 2001. The reversal performance also gets 














Table 9: Performance Persistence Patterns with Alphas 
The table reports cross-product ratios (CPR), Z-statistics (Z-statistic), and Chi-square statistics 
(2) by using alphas produced by the Carhart 4-factor model with the time windows of 24 
months (Panel A) and 36 months (Panel B). The total sample represents the values calculated 
for the whole time period from 1996 to 2019. The asterisks represent different significance 
levels – (***) is 1%, (**) is 5%, and (*) is 10%.  
 
                        Panel A: 24 months  
Time period CPR Z-statistic 2 
1996-97 0.29 -1.27 1.70 
1998-99 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2000-01 3.56 1.95** 3.94** 
2002-03 1.38 0.57 0.32 
2004-05 2.47 1.62 2.67 
2006-07 0.94 -0.12 0.01 
2008-09 1.85 1.16 1.36 
2010-11 0.80 -0.41 0.17 
2012-13 0.46 -1.38 1.93 
2014-15 0.21 -2.66*** 7.42*** 
2016-17 2.68 1.82* 3.38* 
Total sample 1.10 0.55 0.31 
                         
                        Panel B: 36 months 
Time period CPR Z-statistic 2 
1996-98 0.41 -1.04 1.11 
1999-01 11.14 3.09*** 11.07*** 
2002-04 1.97 1.15 1.34 
2005-07 1.68 0.95 0.91 
2008-10 2.23 1.46 2.15 
2011-13 0.67 -0.70 0.49 
2014-16 0.31 -1.96** 3.95** 
Total sample 1.33 1.29 1.66 
 
 
The analysis on risk-adjusted returns indicates one-time performance persistence in the whole 
sample period that lasts up to three years and another strong reversal in the performance that 
also lasts up to three years. Although there is persistence detected in one time period, the 
analysis of the total sample fails to display any significant performance persistence. 
Compared to the analysis on raw returns, performance persistence with alphas seems to be less 
substantial, which can be partially explained by adjusting the returns for the risk factors and 




We conduct a study on 99 actively managed Norwegian mutual funds that existed from 1996 
to 2019 to examine if the mutual funds deliver in excess of the returns generated by passive 
benchmarks and whether the performance is persistent over time.  
We find no excess returns when performance is evaluated against the Fama and French 3-
factor and Carhart 4-factor models on the whole sample period. After aggregate performance 
assessment, we employ Fama and French technique (1997) to bootstrap the results we got and 
differentiate luck from skill in the returns.  
We discover that when ranked by alpha estimates, the worst-performing funds in the sample 
have negative alphas at 5 or 10% significance level produced by the Carhart 4-factor model, 
meaning underperformance against the benchmark for those funds. The alpha estimates for 
the rest of the funds are indistinguishable from zero; therefore, there is no evidence of excess 
performance. When funds are sorted by t-statistics, which is generally perceived as a more 
accurate estimate, there is no abnormal performance among any funds. Therefore, the 
bootstrap analysis shows no evidence for managerial skill among Norwegian mutual funds.  
To detect the presence of persistent performance, we follow Carhart's methodology (1997) to 
test yearly performance persistence on raw net returns. We find no indication of yearly 
persistence when performance is measured against the Fama and French and Carhart models. 
We also examine performance persistence using the recursive portfolio approach on risk-
adjusted returns produced by the Carhart 4-factor model. Regardless of ranking methodology, 
the worst-performing quantiles of funds exhibit performance persistence up to 24 months. The 
results suggest that past-losers in the lowest-ranked quantiles persist in generating negative 
risk-adjusted returns both in the short and long term. In comparison, past winners fail to repeat 
their performance in the consequent periods. Since we also bootstrap the results, we find 
evidence that negative performance persistence is attributed to poor managerial skills rather 
than bad luck. 
In addition to the tests mentioned above, we employ non-parametric techniques to test 
performance persistence. We construct contingency tables using raw net returns and risk-
adjusted returns. The findings of the contingency tables are aligned with the previous results 
that losers remain losers in the subsequent time periods, while winners do not experience 
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persistent positive performance over time. The results are similar for 12-, 24- and 36-month 
time intervals. Additionally, for all the contingency tables, the lowest-performing quintile of 
funds has the highest probability to perish in the subsequent period. 
Another non-parametric method that we apply is a cross-product ratio. We obtain CPR with Z 
and Chi-squared statistics using raw net returns and risk-adjusted returns. With raw net returns, 
funds exhibit performance persistence in four different time periods, while with risk-adjusted 
returns and longer time interval, most of the persistence disappears. The only persistent returns 
are detected from 2000 to 2001 with the 24-month performance interval and from 1999 to 
2001 with the 36-month performance interval. Nevertheless, we find no evidence of 
performance persistence when the tests are conducted on total samples for raw net and risk-
adjusted returns.  
All in all, we find no compelling evidence that the Norwegian fund managers generate positive 
excess returns for investors. The evidence shows poor managerial performance for the worst-
performing funds. Regarding performance persistence, only the worst-performing funds 
continue to repeat their negative performance, which lasts up to two years. Many other funds, 
including the best-performing ones, reverse their positive performance in the subsequent 
period and deliver statistically significant negative performance when measured against the 
passive benchmark. The rest of the funds simply deliver zero values in excess returns. 
Considering that we conduct our study on net returns, we cannot claim whether managers in 
Norway are able to produce excess returns before charging management fees. However, we 
can still say that investors do not receive the returns that are to be expected from actively 
managed mutual funds. Since the mutual funds' managers fail to deliver promised gains in 
excess of the passive benchmarks consistently, it is advisable to invest in a broad low-cost 







Appendix 1: List of all mutual funds selected with the number of observations for each 
Fund Name Number of observations 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 288 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 180 
Alfred Berg Gambak 288 
Alfred Berg Humanfond 240 
Alfred Berg Norge + 195 
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 288 
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 144 
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 68 
Arctic Norwegian Equities A 108 
Arctic Norwegian Equities B 109 
Arctic Norwegian Equities D 82 
Arctic Norwegian Equities E 46 
Arctic Norwegian Equities I 109 
Arctic Norwegian Value Creation A 64 
Arctic Norwegian Value Creation B 64 
Arctic Norwegian Value Creation C 59 
Arctic Norwegian Value Creation D 36 
C WorldWide Norge 288 
C WorldWide Norge III 212 
Danske Invest Engros Norske A I R NOK I 54 
Danske Invest Norge I 288 
Danske Invest Norge II 288 
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 288 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst I 236 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst II 157 
Delphi Norge A 288 
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 218 
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 225 
DNB Norge (I) 218 
DNB Norge (III) 281 
DNB Norge C 286 
DNB Norge D 205 
DNB Norge N 288 
DNB Norge R 13 
DNB Norge Selektiv 280 
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 212 
DNB Norge Selektiv C 216 
DNB Norge Selektiv E 288 
DNB Norge Selektiv N 284 
DNB Norge Selektiv R 13 
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Eika Egenkapitalbevis 216 
Eika Norge 195 
Eika SMB 185 
FIRST Norge Fokus 13 
Fondsfinans Norge 204 
Formue Diversifiserte Norske Aksjer 110 
FORTE Norge 105 
FORTE Trønder 83 
Globus Aktiv Acc 87 
Globus Norge A/I 101 
Globus Norge II Acc 93 
Handelsbanken Norge 260 
Handelsbanken Norge (A1 NOK) 288 
Handelsbanken Norge (A10 NOK) 21 
Holberg Norge A 228 
KLP AksjeNorge 249 
Landkreditt Norge 120 
Landkreditt Utbytte A 82 
Landkreditt Utbytte I 18 
NB Aksjefond 205 
Nordea 1 - Norwegian Equity AP NOK 50 
Nordea 1 - Norwegian Equity BC NOK 74 
Nordea 1 - Norwegian Equity BI NOK 24 
Nordea 1 - Norwegian Equity BP NOK 265 
Nordea 1 - Norwegian Equity E NOK 190 
Nordea Avkastning 288 
Nordea Kapital 288 
Nordea Norge Pluss 104 
Nordea SMB 212 
Nordea Vekst 229 
ODIN Norge A 288 
ODIN Norge C 288 
ODIN Norge D 288 
ODIN Norge II 137 
Pareto Aksje Norge A 207 
Pareto Aksje Norge B 168 
Pareto Aksje Norge C 53 
Pareto Aksje Norge D 53 
Pareto Aksje Norge I 219 
Pareto Equity Edge D 41 
Pareto Equity Edge P 62 
PLUSS Aksje 276 
PLUSS Markedsverdi 288 
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RF Aksjefond Acc 112 
RF Plussfond Acc 52 
Sbanken Framgang Sammen 47 
SEB Norway Focus Fund C NOK 45 
SEB Norway Focus Fund HNWC NOK 45 
SEB Norway Focus Fund IC NOK 45 
SEF FIRST SMB A NOK 116 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 281 
Storebrand Norge A 288 
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri A 32 
Storebrand Norge H 103 
Storebrand Norge I 236 
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 37 
Storebrand Optima Norge B 219 
Storebrand Verdi A 264 
Storebrand Verdi N 21 
































Appendix 2: Statistics of mutual funds used in the sample 
Year 
Total 








1996 29 29 0 
1997 34 34 0 
1998 41 41 0 
1999 42 42 0 
2000 46 46 0 
2001 49 49 0 
2002 57 57 0 
2003 59 59 0 
2004 61 61 0 
2005 62 62 0 
2006 63 61 2 
2007 61 60 1 
2008 60 60 0 
2009 60 59 1 
2010 63 63 0 
2011 67 67 0 
2012 68 67 1 
2013 70 68 2 
2014 68 64 4 
2015 66 64 2 
2016 69 68 1 
2017 70 69 1 
2018 76 76 0 
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